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Purpose 
• The purpose of presentation is to provide an overview on 
the application of software safety practices to the NASA 
Constellation Program (CxP) Ground Operations Project 
(GOP) Command, Control, and Communications (CCC) 
Element Launch Control System (LCS) software 
development activities 
• The LCS software safety program resulted in the 
successful implementation of the NASA Software Safety 
Standard NASA-STO-8719.138 and CxP software safety 
requirements 
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Background 
• Constellation Program: 
The purpose of the Constellation Program (CxP) is to develop flight 
and ground infrastructure and systems required to enable continued 
human access to space after the Space Shuttle retirement and 
provide future crewed missions to the Moon, Mars and beyond. 
• CCC Element: 
The Command, Control and Communications Element will provide 
the Launch Control System (LCS) and associated communications 
infrastructure to process and launch the CxP launch vehicles and 
payloads. 
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Background 
• Launch Control System: 
The Launch Control System (LCS) provides testing, systems 
integration and launch site processing for Exploration vehicles and 
their associated ground support systems. This includes computer 
hardware and software and communications equipment integral to 
command and control. 
• Kennedy Ground Control System (KGCS): 
The Kennedy Ground Control System provides the hardware for 
control and monitoring of GSE and of vehicle analogs and discretes. 
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Command, Control, and Communications 
Project 
General Characteristics 
Design maximizes the use of industrial based process control 
products and COTS to configure a software 
communication and data distribution architecture rather 
than build one from scratch 
Launch Control System (LCS) 
LCS - provides C&C functionality for vehicle processing. 
LCS Hardware Architecture 
Control Room Workstation - Windows/Linux platforms 
providing Thin-Client Displays, Light-Weight Displays, 
and Application Display Clients 
Application/Gateway/Display Servers - UnixiLinux platforms, 
Mid-Range, multi-processor servers providing 
Integrated Control Applications, Subsystem Control 
applications, reactive control, emergency vehicle safing, 
command processing and telemetry data publication. 
LCC Control Rooms 
Firing Room 1 for Ares 1/ Orion, 
Firing Room 4 for Ares V / LSAM 
LCS Simulation System 
Element simulation, training, and testing support 
Industrial Controllers - embedded control systems to r---In-te-gr-a-te-d-B-ui-Id---' 
provide closed loop control. Management 
HB
1
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process,"; 
LCS System Software Architecture 
Isolation service layers providing common functionality, 
data logging services, networking services, recording 
services, commanding services, application framework, 
display framework and system monitoring and control. 
LCS Application Software 
Processing Operations Applications for Orion/Ares I. 
Processing Operations Applications for LSAM/Ares V. 
System (IBMS) 
Configuration 
Data 
Launch Control Center (LCG) 
Commands & Data for 
Flight Vehicle & GSE 
~~ 
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Control and Monitoring, 
Data Recording and Retrieval 
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System Overview 
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System Overview Summary 
A failure of one or more of the following can cause a hazard to 
occur if the operation being performed is a hazardous operation: 
• Critical Hardware 
• Application Software 
• System Software 
• Operating Systems 
• Firmware 
A failure in Test Software that yields false positives in test results 
that test the above items can contribute towards a hazard. 
An error in the operational procedures can also cause a hazard 
to occur. 
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Overall Software Safety 
Approach 
• Integrated approach: Software Safety is implemented jointly with project 
management, designers, and developers as part of the system design and software 
development processes from the start of the project 
• All project members understand they have a responsibility for implementing safety 
and that Software Safety's role is to ensure everyone is taking responsibility for 
implementing safety in their area 
• Designers/developers are educated about Software Safety requirements anq 
processes 
• Software Safety helps developers define plans/processes/procedures that require 
safety considerations and additional checks/rigor for safety-critical software (e.g., 
identification of software requirements as safety-critical, 100% segment coverage in 
unit test for safety-critical code) 
• Software Safety assists developers in defining software coding standards that contain 
Software Safety related rules 
• Software Safety assures the plans, processes, procedures, and coding standards 
pertaining to Software Safety are followed 
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Implementing the Software 
Safety Program 
• Identify potential hazards and hazard causes (Fault Tree Analysis) 
• Identify computer-based control requirements used to control (e.g. , eliminate, 
mitigate, reduce , respond to) the hazards/causes - flow down & make these into 
Level 4 requirements 
• Identify other LCS/KGCS system-level safety requirements - also make these into 
Level 4 requirements 
• Annotate the above Level 4 requirements as "controls" for the hazard causes and link 
controls to causes (in Hazard Reports) 
• Use requirements decomposition, requirements traceability, and application of 
Software Safety Litmus Test to tag decomposed requirements (Level 5 requirements) 
as "safety-critical" -- TRACEABILITY IS VERY IMPORTANT fff 
• Perform software safety analyses/checks upon selected software products 
(requirements, design, code, tests) by independent software safety analysts 
- Use software risk methodology to decide which software products to sample 
- Perform software safety technical analyses 
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Software Safety Traceability 
Hazard Report identifies hazards, causes, 
controls, verifications 
- Controls are Level 4 Requirements 
- Verifications are Test Procedures that 
verify the Level 4 Requirements 
1 
System Requirements 
(Level 4) 
- Attribute is "safety-critical" for 
those requirements related to 
Hazard Reports 
1 
Next Page 
System Test Plans/Procedures 
......... (Level 4) 
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Software Safety Traceability 
Previous Page 
1 
Software Requirements/Use Cases 
(Level 5) 
-Attribute is "safety-critical" for those 
requirements/use cases that meet 
Software Safety Litmus Test Criteria 
1 
Software Test Plans/Procedures 
(Level 5) 
-Attribute is "safety-critical" for 
those test sequences that test 
safety-critical requirements 
-Verification Method = Test 
Software Design (Level 5) 
- Attribute is "safety-critical" for 
....... those design components that 
implement safety-critical 
requirements and/or that meet 
Software Safety Litmus Test 
Criteria 
t 
Source Code (Level 5) 
- Attribute is "safety-critical" for 
those design components that 
implement safety-critical 
requirements and/or that meet 
Software Safety Litmus Test 
Criteria 
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Development of ERD Safety Critical 
Requirements and Hazard Report 
Ground Elements Command, Control, and Communications Project Element Requirements 
Document GOP407001 Safety Requirements were developed using: 
-GOP Preliminary Hazard Analysis Report for EDR (GOP507025) 
-System Assurance Analysis of LCS/KGCS (723CAA00001) 
All three documents including the draft LCS HR were used as inputs into the GOP-GEN-GSW-011 
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Element Requirements Document (ERD) 
GOP 407001-01 Safety Requirements 
• The purpose of the ERD is to define the technical requirements 
allocated from Ground Systems to the CCCE 
• It defines the detailed system-level technical requirements and the 
verification methods (test, demonstration, inspection and analysis) 
for the CCCE. 
• The ERD contains a total of 540 requirements 
- 304 are allocated to LCS 
- 160 are designated as safety-critical 
• A subset of the safety requirements were identified as controls for 
the hazard causes listed in GOP-GEN-GSW-011 
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• The GOP Preliminary Hazard Analysis Report for 
EDR GOP507025 contains the Preliminary Hazards 
List 
- identifies Loss of Control/Loss of Critical Function as a 
Hazardous Condition caused by 
• Loss of Command 
• Loss of Monitoring or Control Function 
• Loss of Critical Data 
• Unsolicited Command 
• Loss of Data (data used by control functions) 
• Loss of Monitoring 
• Failure to Operate 
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• The LCS/KGCS SAA Fault Tree and Hazard Analysis identified 
Loss of Control and Software Failure as a Hazardous Condition 
caused by: 
- Loss of Command 
- Latent Command 
- Latent Data 
- Corrupt Command 
- Corrupt Data 
- Unsolicited Command 
- Missed/Misinterpreted Requirement 
- Insufficient Testing 
- Configuration Error 
- Loss of Data 
- Sequencing Error 
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identifies: Loss of 
Life/Mission/Flight Hardware 
due to Loss of Control, which 
can be caused by Software 
Failure .. JJJJ~ 
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• The CxP Level 3 GO hazard analyses are driven by CxP Hazard Analysis 
Methodology (CxP 70038) requirements 
• These analyses are organized based on the GO processing flow 
- CxP 72149, Volume 3, Ground Operations Planning Document (GOPD) 
- Logical ordering consistent with major facilities and significant operations 
within those facilities 
• Top-level fault tree structure shows how GO hazard reports are organized 
• GO hazard reports are packaged as part of the System Safety Assessment 
Report (SSAR) and was processed through the CSERP in a series of Phase 
Safety Reviews 
- Industrial Ground Processing Hazard Report (1 total) 
- General Ground Processing Hazard Reports (11 total) 
- Operation-Specific Ground Processing Hazard Reports (36 total) 
8-10 Feb 2011 International Conference on Software Quality - ICSQ 2011 20 
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• Top GO fault tree event is Loss of Life, Flight Hardware, Facilities, 
and/or GSE During Ground Processing (Loss of life includes injury; 
Loss of Flight Hardware, Facilities, and/or GSE includes damage) 
• Industrial Ground Processing Hazard Report (GOP-IND-ALL-001) 
addresses standard industrial hazard concerns associated with 
ground processing 
• General Ground Processing Hazard Reports (11 total) document 
typical ground processing hazards and their associated hazard 
causes. These hazard causes will occur numerous times in (and be 
pointed to from) Operation-Specific Ground Processing hazard 
reports 
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• General Ground Processing Hazard Reports (11 total) document typical 
ground processing hazards and their associated hazard causes 
- (GOP-GEN-BAT-001) Improper Handling/Charging of Flight Batteries 
- (GOP-GEN-CON-002) Introduction of Contamination into Flight Systems 
- (GOP-GEN-ESD-003) Failure to Protect ESD-Sensitive Equipment from the 
Effects of Static Discharge 
- (GOP-GEN-FOD-004) Failure to Control FOD 
-
- (GOP-GEN-TRN-005) Transport and Handling of Flight Hardware Between 
KSC Facilities 
- (GOP-GEN-HPS-006) Improper Handling/Configuration of Pressurized 
Systems 
- (GOP-GEN-LFT-007) Failure of Lifting Devices or Associated Equipment 
- (GOP-GEN-MAT-008) Flammable/Combustible Materials Could Ignite 
- (GOP-GEN-STR-009) Failure of Support Equipment and Handling 
Equipment Due to Corrosion/Induced Loads 
- (GOP-GEN-WEA-010) Exposure to Adverse Weather 
- (GOP-GEN-GSW-011) Loss of Control due to Ground Software Failures 
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• Operation-Specific Ground Processing Hazard Reports (35 total) 
document unique ground processing hazards and their associated 
causes. These hazard reports are based on the detailed analysis of 
hazards associated with the Ares I ground processing flow 
• A total of 11 of these Operation-Specific Ground Processing Hazard 
Reports have been identified as containing software-related 
hazards 
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• Hazard Report 
General Hazard Report for 
Software 
- GOP-GEN-GSW-011, Loss of Control of Flight Hardware/Ground Subsystems 
Due to Ground Software (Launch Control System/Kennedy Ground Control 
System [LCS/ KGCS]) Failure Results in Loss of Life, Flight Hardware, Facilities, 
and/or GSE 
• Hazardous Condition Description 
- The Launch Control System (LCS) and Kennedy Ground Control System 
(KGCS) provide testing, systems integration and launch site processing for 
Exploration vehicles and their associated ground support systems. 
- This includes computer hardware, software, and communications equipment 
integral to command the control 
- The LCS will be used to support activities such as: control of launch site GSE; 
monitoring vehicle health and status; recording and retrieval of data 
communications; and control of flight elements 
- LCS allows users to command, control, and monitor the flight vehicle during VAS 
and Pad operations 
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General Hazard Report for Software 
(Cant) 
• Hazardous Condition Description (Continued) 
- LCS provides command, control, and monitoring capability during integration of 
the flight vehicle in the VAS. This includes integration between the flight 
vehicle/spacecraft and ground elements during the final assembly and checkout 
of launch vehicles in the VAS 
- LCS also provides command, control, and monitoring capabilities during element 
servicing, launch readiness, and terminal launch countdown operations at the 
Pad 
- LCS interfaces with Mobile Launcher (ML) GSE and is used to command, 
control, and monitor ML GSE, which in turn, has direct interfaces with the 
vehicle, including: umbilicals; propellants; hydraulics; 
pneumatics/purge/pressure; coolant; environmental control; access and 
handling; power; command/control/monitoring; communication and data; 
hazardous gas detection; propellant fire detection; launch vehicle ignition and 
separation; launch vehicle range safety; and lightning detection 
- LCS command and control software failures and ground software development 
process deficiencies can lead to loss of control of the launch vehicle and/or GSE 
subsystems, which can result in loss of life, flight hardware, facilities, and/or GSE 
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GOP-GEN-GSW-011 
Software Hazard Causes 
- (Cause 1) Loss of Command 
- (Cause 2) Latent Command 
- (Cause 3) Corrupt Command 
- (Cause 4) Unsolicited Command 
- (Cause 5) Sequencing Error I LCS/KGCS Software Failures I 
- (Cause 6) Loss of Data 
- (Cause 7) Latent Data 
- (Cause 8) Corrupt Data 
---------------------------------------------------
- (Cause 9) Configuration Error 
- (Cause 10) Inadequate Testing 
- (Cause 11) Requirements Error 
- (Cause 12) Design Error 
- (Cause 13) Coding Error 
- (Cause 14) Security Breach 
LCS/KGCS Software Development 
Process Deficiencies 
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Software Hazard Cause 
Definitions 
• Loss of Command - Inability to Issue Commands 
• Latent Command - Commands Delayed from Being 
Issued and/or Received 
• Corrupt Command - Command Issued is Incorrect Due 
to Corruption 
• Unsolicited Command - Command Issued Inadvertently 
or Without Cause 
• Sequencing Error - Failure to Issue Commands in the 
Correct Sequence 
• Loss of Data - Data Required to Maintain Control is 
Missing or Incomplete 
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Software Hazard Cause 
Definitions 
• Latent Data - Data that is Delayed and not Provided 
Within the Time Required 
• Invalid Data - Data is Incorrect or Incomplete 
• Corrupt Data - Data Corrupted During Transmission 
• Configuration Error - Software Load/Build Does not 
Contain Required Displays/Commands/Data) 
• Requirements Error - Requirements not Fully Defined or 
Incorrectly Translated from Requirement to Design 
• . Design Error - Errors not Detected and/or Removed) 
• Coding Error - Insufficient Coding Standards or Coding 
Reviews 
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Software Hazard Cause 
Definitions 
• Security Breach - External Act that Bypasses or 
Contravenes System Security 
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on Software Qyality 
(1) loss of Command -Inability 
to issue command(s) due to 
incompatible transmission 
protocols/ha ndsha kes 
between interfacing 
systems/ subsystems in the 
end-to-end-command the 
data paths. Inability to issue 
command(s) due to the 
transmission 
protocol/scheme selected 
during the design effort not 
being correctly designed for 
real-time applications such 
that transmission loss/failure 
goes undetected and/or 
uncorrected. Inability to 
issue command(s) due to 
loss of timing signal 
distribution during 
hazardous operations. 
Inability to issue 
command(s) due to failure 
to react to hazard control 
related measurements 
8-10 Feb 2011 
Catastrophic 
(5) 
Low 
(2) 
Summa 
-The following Command, Control, and Communications 
Element (CCCE) Element Requirements Document GOP 
407001-01 requirements provide the controls for this hazard 
cause: 
[R.GE7018] Error Message Handling 
[R.GE7019] Continued Operations in Presence of Single Fault 
[R.GE7072] Hold Countdown: Discrete Signals 
[R.GE7074] Safety-Critical loss of Communication Failure 
Detection 
[R.GE7078] Timing/Sequencing of Safety-Critical Commands 
[R.GE7079] Simulated Data Versus Real End Item Data 
[R.GE7099] limit Monitoring and Event Exception 
[R.GE7110] Hazardous Conditions Monitoring 
[R.GE7117] Fault Tolerance Notification 
[R.GE7445] End-Item Event Notification 
[R.GE7458] Continued Operations in Presence of Single Fault 
[R.GE7468] No Disruption of Network Communication 
[R.GE7471] Propagation Failures in GSE and Flight Vehicle 
[R.GE7473] Safety Critical Communication Failure 
Notification 
[R.GE7474] Feedback for User-Initiated Safety Critical 
Commands 
[R.GE7505] Display Event Notification 
[R.GE7514] Command Response Specification 
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Hazard Cause - Loss of 
Command 
• Loss of Command 
- Inability to issue command(s) due to incompatible transmission 
protocols/handshakes between interfacing systems/ subsystems 
in the end-to-end-command the data paths. 
- Inability to issue command(s) due to the transmission 
protocol/scheme selected during the design effort not being 
correctly designed for real-time applications such that 
transmission loss/failure goes undetected and/or uncorrected. 
Inability to issue command(s) due to loss of timing signal 
distribution during hazardous operations. 
- Inability to issue command(s) due to failure to react to hazard 
control related measurements 
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Hazard Controls - Loss of 
Command 
• The following Command, Control, and Communications Element (CCCE) Element 
Requirements Document GOP 407001-01 requirements provide the controls for this 
hazard cause: 
- [R.GE7018] Error Message Handling 
- [R.GE7019] Continued Operations in Presence of Single Fault 
- [R.GE7074] Safety-Critical Loss of Communication Failure Detection 
- [R.GE7078] Timing/Sequencing of Safety-Critical Commands 
- [R.GE7099] Limit Monitoring and Event Exception 
- [R.GE7110] Hazardous Conditions Monitoring 
- [R.GE7117] Fault Tolerance Notification 
- [R.GE7445] End-Item Event Notification 
- [R.GE7458] Continued Operations in Presence of Single Fault 
- [R.GE7468] No Disruption of Network Communication 
- [R.GE7473] Safety Critical Communication Failure Notification 
- [R.GE7474] Feedback for User-Initiated Safety Critical Commands 
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Hazard Controls - Loss of 
Command 
• [R.GE7018] Error and Message Handling 
- The CCCE LCS Subsystem shall provide error and message 
handling. 
- This includes logging messages and displays of messages. This 
will aid in trouble-shooting and recreating any anomalous 
conditions. Error messages displayed at the console provide 
information on for a future course of action requiring 
commanding to the end-items. It allows errors in commanding to 
be detected prior to operations start and for a fix or workaround 
to be developed. It allows the operator to identify, prior to issuing 
a command, if the command will not be executed due to a 
system anomaly. It raises the level of awareness if a command 
may be delayed, and if data provided to the system may be 
delayed, incorrect/incomplete, corrupt, or missing. 
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Hazard Controls - Loss of 
Command 
• [R.GE7019] Data Acquisition Fault Tolerance 
- The CCCE subsystems data acquisition and processing 
functionality shall continue to operate in the presence of a single 
fault in any system component. 
- This functionality associated with essential end items will 
continue to operate in the presence of a single fault in any 
system component. This allows ability to send a command even 
in the presence of a fault. The reliability of the data acquired 
ensures the correct command is executed. It allows the system 
to continue processing data in the presence of a fault to prevent 
missing, invalid, delayed, or corrupt data. 
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Hazard Controls - Loss of 
Command 
• [R.GE7074] Safety-Critical Loss of Communication 
Failure Detection 
- The CCCE subsystems shall detect loss of communication with 
end items within (TBDCCCERD-008) seconds beginning with the 
failure event and ending with system recognition of the failure 
when any communications path linking safety critical software 
and its end-item fails. 
- The Command and Control System needs to be aware of the 
health and status of communications links to the vehicle and 
GSE. During critical operations, a loss of communication with 
end items could result in critical or catastrophic events. 
Therefore, detection of communications loss is needed to allow 
users to safe the system. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-SVC-002 
• Title: Ares 1 High Pressure Gas Servicing At LC-39 Pad B Results In Loss Of 
Life, Flight Hardware, Facility, And/Or GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 5 - Overpressurization 
/U nderpressu rization 
• Hazard Cause Description: During FS Roll Control System (RoCS), US 
Reaction Control System (ReCS), Ambient Fill Bottle, and Upper Stage 
Engine (USE) Spin Start Bottle fill operations, high pressure gas servicing 
GSE components fail to regulate pressure and/or human error can cause 
flight hardware system overpressure/underpressure. Software is used to 
command GSE valves open and closed to monitor pressure for the 
servicing GSE, and to monitor temperature measurements from the 
vehicle. 
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fntematiW~i~W~ Hazard Controls 
• LCS/KGCS controls the Gaseous Helium (GHe) pneumatically-
operated inlet valves by switching 28VDC power to solenoid valves, 
which apply Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2) to the actuators using primary 
and redundant Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), whose 
outputs are both issued simultaneously to energize solenoids from 
primary and redundant power sources (i.e., there are redundant 
signal paths [A and B] to each solenoid valve). 
• Software (i.e., Integrated Launch and Operations Application [ILOA] 
Computer Software Configuration Items [CSCI] Main Propulsion 
System, Upper Stage Engine, and Roll/Reaction Control Systems) is 
used to command the helium servicing GSE fill isolation valves to 
close when pressure transducers on the helium servicing GSE read 
TBD psig pressure. 
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fntemati~~=~ Hazard Controls 
• The MUST-WORK software functions are correct commanding (i.e., 
opening/closing) of the isolation valves, pneumatically-operated inlet 
valves, and the electronically-controlled dome regulators. 
• The MUST-NOT-WORK software function is commanding the 
regulator high. (NOTE: Additional MUST-WORK and MUST-NOT-
WORK software functions may be identified as the ILOA CSCI Main 
Propulsion System, Upper Stage Engine, and Roll/Reaction Control 
Systems development matures.) 
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Ove rpressu rization/U nde rpressu rization 
Hazard Controls 
• Controls for hazard causes related to LCS/KGCS software failures 
and ground software development process deficiencies are 
addressed in the following general hazard report: 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 C01 (Loss of Command) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 C02 (Latent Command) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 C03 (Corrupt Command) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 C04 (Unsolicited Command) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 COS (Sequencing Error) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 C06 (Loss of Data) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 CO? (Latent Data) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 COB (Invalid Data) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 COg (Corrupt Data) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 C10 (Configuration Error) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 C11 (Requirements Error) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 C12 (Design Error) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 C13 (Coding Error) 
- HR GOP-GEN-GSW-011 C14 (Security Breach) 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: GOP-OSS-TST-OOl 
• Title: Orion Short Stack Portable Equipment, Payloads, And Cargo (PEPC) 
Testing And Fit Checks In The Multi-Purpose Processing Facility (MPPF) 
Results In Loss Of Life And/Or Damage To Flight Hardware 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 6 - Inadvertent Orion subsystem 
activation during OSS configuration for powered cargo/FCEjlVT 
• Hazard Cause Description: During final configuration of the Orion Short 
Stack for powered cargo/Flight Crew Equipment/Integrated Vehicle Tests 
(IVTs), Launch Control System (LCS) software is used to issue a sequence of 
commands. Improper commanding (e.g., corrupt command, unsolicited 
command, sequencing error) may inadvertently activate specified Orion 
subsystems (e.g., solar arrays, separation pyrotechnics) that are not 
intended for activation during ground processing operations. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: OSS-SVC-002 
• Title: Orion Short Stack High Pressure Gas Servicing (GHe, GN2, G02) In 
The Multi-Purpose Processing Facility (MPPF) Results In Loss Of Life, Short 
Stack, Facility, And/Or GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 3 -
Overpressu rizati on/U nderpressu rizati on 
• Hazard Cause Description: During Orion ECLSS, Reaction Control System, 
and Main Propulsion System fill operations, high pressure gas servicing 
GSE components fail to regulate pressure and/or human error can cause 
flight hardware system overpressure/underpressure. Software is used to 
command GSE valves open and closed, to monitor pressure for the 
servicing GSE, and to monitor temperature measurements from the 
vehicle. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: OSS-SVC-003 
• Title: Orion Short Stack Hypergolic Servicing (Fuel/Oxidizer) In The Multi-
Purpose Processing Facility (MPPF) Results In Loss Of Life, Short Stack, 
Facility, And/Or GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 3 - Overfill/Underfill (weight 
scale failure) 
• Hazard Cause Description: Overfill/underfill of the hypergolic tanks due to 
electrical weight scale failure. Software is used to command hypergol 
servicing GSE valves open and closed, to monitor pressure/temperature 
on the hypergol servicing GSE, and to monitor temperature measurements 
from the vehicle. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: OSS-SVC-003 
• Title: Orion Short Stack Hypergolic Servicing (Fuel/Oxidizer) In The Multi-
Purpose Processing Facility (MPPF) Results In Loss Of Life, Short Stack, 
~acilityI And/Or GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 11 - Overpressurization 
• Hazard Cause Description: Servicing GSE fails to regulate flight hardware 
tank ullage pressure, causing flight hardware system overpressure. 
Software is used to command GSE valves open and closed and to monitor 
pressure/temperature on the hypergol servicing GSE. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: ITC-TST-OOl 
• Title: Configuration of Hardware to Support Orion/Ares I Integrated Test 
and Closeout Activities in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) Results in 
Loss of Life, Flight Hardware, Facilities, and/or GSE. 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 6 - Composite Overwrapped 
Pressure Vessel (COPV) rupture (Main Propulsion System [MPS] and Roll 
Control System [RoCS]) during pr.essurization/repressurization operations 
• Hazard Cause Description: During FS RoCS, and MPS Ambient Fill Bottle fill 
operations, high pressure gas servicing GSE components fail to regulate 
pressure and/or human error can cause flight hardware system 
overpressure/underpressure. Software is used to command GSE valves 
open and closed to monitor pressure for the servicing GSE, and to monitor 
temperature measurements from the vehicle. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
. Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-TST-OOl 
• Title: Configuration of Hardware to Support Orion/Ares I Testing Activities 
at LC-39 Pad B Results in Loss of Life, Flight Hardware, Facilities, And/Or 
GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 3 - Composite Overwrapped 
Pressure Vessel (COPV) Rupture (Main Propulsion System [MPS]) during 
pressure maintenance operations for the J-2X Engine Control Unit 
Confidence Check 
• Hazard Cause Description: The GHe servicing GSE pressurizes the two Spin 
Start helium tanks to replenish the helium withdrawn for the J-2X Engine 
Confidence Check test. Failure of the helium servicing GSE to regulate 
pressure and/or human error can cause flight hardware system 
overpressure. Software is used to command GSE valves open and closed, 
and to monitor pressure/temperature for the helium servicing GSE. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-SVC-OOl 
• Title: Ares 1 Hydrazine Servicing At LC-39 Pad B Results In Loss Of Life, 
Flight Hardware, Facility, And/Or GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 5 - Overpressurization 
• Hazard Cause Description: During FS RoCS and US ReCS fill operations, 
hydrazine servicing GSE fails to regulate flight hardware tank ullage 
pressure, causing flight hardware system overpressure. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-PVR-OOl 
• Title: Inadvertent Ignition of Orion/Ares I Pyrotechnics During Final 
Ordnance Connections/Testing at LC-39 Pad B Results in Loss of Life, Flight 
Hardware, Facilities, and/or GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 6 - Improper Pyrotechnic 
Initiator Controller (GO-PIC) resistance test 
• Hazard Cause Description: Improper Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller (GO-
PIC) resistance test at LC-39 Pad B due to overcurrent. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-SVC-003 
• Title: Cryogenic Loading Operations At LC-39 Pad B Results In Loss of Life, 
Flight Hardware, Facilities, And/Or GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 1 -
Overpressurization/underpressurization of Cold GHe bottles and LH2/L02 
tanks 
• Hazard Cause Description: The Cold GHe servicing GSE pressurizes the 10 
helium bottles inside the hydrogen tank after the hydrogen tank is filled, 
and pressurizes the LH2 and L02 tanks on the vehicle. Failure of the Cold 
GHe servicing GSE to regulate pressure and/or human error can cause 
flight hardware system overpressure/underpressure. Software is used to 
command GSE valves open and closed, to monitor pressure/temperature 
for the Cold GHe servicing GSE, and to monitor pressure/temperature 
measurements from the vehicle. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-SVC-003 
• Title: Cryogenic Loading Operations At LC-39 Pad B Results In Loss of Life, 
Flight Hardware, Facilities, And/Or GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software Cause 4 - Premature Disconnect of 
Upper Stage (LH2,L02, Instrument Unit [IUl) umbilicals 
• Hazard Cause Description: Each US umbilical plate is held onto the vehicle 
by a single collet, and is commanded by the Launch Release System (LRS) 
to separate at T-O. Failure of the collet or an erroneous signal from the LRS 
can cause a premature disconnect. Premature disconnect during tanking 
may result in cryogenic leakage. Cryogenic contact with energized 
electrical connectors may result in fire/explosion. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-SVC-003 
• Title: Cryogenic Loading Operations At LC-39 Pad B Results In Loss of Life, 
Flight Hardware, Facilities, And/Or GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 6 - Overfill/Underfill of L02 and 
LH2 tanks 
• Hazard Cause Description: Overfill/underfill of cryogenics tanks due to the 
failure of the cryogenic servicing GSE fill valves. The cryogenic servicing 
GSE is remotely commanded by the LCS software to control valve positions 
and to monitor pressure and temperature transducers. The LCS will also 
receive pressure transducers and liquid sensor data from the vehicle 
during servicing operations. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-SVC-003 
• Title: Cryogenic Loading Operations At LC-39 Pad B Results In Loss of Life, 
Flight Hardware, Facilities, And/Or GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 8 - GH2 and G02 
overpressurization (Inability to vent GH2 and G02) 
• Hazard Cause Description: Failure to provide pneumatic pressure for the 
vehicle GH2/G02 vent valves or the failure of the ground GH2 vent valve 
may result in the inability to vent GH2/G02 from the vehicle, which may 
result in overpressurization of the vehicle hydrogen and/or oxygen tanks. 
Software is used to command GSE valves (which in turn open/close flight 
tank vent valves) and to monitor pressure transducers. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-CLO-OOl 
• Title: Configuration of Integrated Vehicle During Closeout Activities Results 
in Loss of Life, Flight Hardware, Facilities and/or GSE. 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 7 - Impact/Collision (Crew 
Access Arm [CAA]) during retraction 
• Hazard Cause Description: Retraction of the CAA/extendable platform will 
be performed remotely at around T-5 minutes using a sequence of Launch 
Control System (LCS) software commands. There exists the possibility of 
CAA/extendable platform impact/collision with the vehicle du~ to an 
erroneous software command (i.e., extend the CAA/extendable platform 
rather than retract the CAA/extendable platform) being issued. This 
includes the console operator manually issuing an improper command. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-LCH-OOl 
• Title: Final Ares I/Orion Integrated Vehicle Launch Countdown Operations 
(Post-Cryogenic Servicing) Until the Vehicle Clears the LC-39 Pad B Mobile 
Launcher Tower Results in Loss of Life, Flight Hardware, Facilities, and/or 
GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 2 - Pre·mature separation 
(Service Module/First Stage Forward Skirt [SM/FSFS] Umbilicals, VSDS 
Arms) 
• Hazard Cause Description: Premature separation due to collet failure or a 
non-commanded signal passing through the Launch Release Signal (LRS) 
Programmable Logic Controllers activating the release solenoids, causing a 
disconnection of the umbilicals (SM, FSFSU) and the Vehicle Stabilization 
and Damping Subsystem (VSDS) stabilizer and sway damper arms. 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-LCH-OOl 
• Title: Final Ares I/Orion Integrated Vehicle Launch Countdown Operations 
(Post-Cryogenic Servicing) Until the Vehicle Clears the LC-39 Pad B Mobile 
Launcher Tower Results in Loss of Life, Flight Hardware, Facilities, and/or 
GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 4 - Failure to provide ignition 
overpressure pulse protection 
• Hazard Cause Description: Failure to provide ignition overpressure 
protection due to a failure in the lOP subsystem (software command 
failure to open the 48-inch butterfly valves, erroneous software command 
which prematurely closes the 48-inch butterfly valves, or a mechanical 
failure that occurs within the allotted time the 48-inch butterfly valves are 
to remain open). 
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Software Hazards in Operation 
Specific Hazard Reports 
• Report Number: PAD-LCH-OOl 
• Title: Final Ares I/Orion Integrated Vehicle Launch Countdown Operations 
(Post-Cryogenic Servicing) Until the Vehicle Clears the LC-39 Pad B Mobile 
Launcher Tower Results in Loss of Life, Flight Hardware, Facilities, and/or 
GSE 
• Hazard Causes Involving Software: Cause 5 - Failure to separate (T-O 
Umbilicals and Vehicle Stabilization and Damping Subsystem [VSDS] arms) 
• Hazard Cause Description: During the First Stage (FS) ignition sequence a 
failure of the Launch Release System (LRS) to receive the T-O umbilical 
release command from the vehicle (coupled with failure of the backup 
separation modes) would result in FS ignition without LRS T-O umbilical 
release/retraction. 
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on Software Qyality 
• The application of software safety practices on the LCS 
project resulted in the successful implementation of the 
NASA Software Safety Standard NASA-STD-8719.138 
and CxP software safety requirements 
• The GOP-GEN-GSW-011 Hazard Report was the first 
report developed at KSC to identify software hazard 
causes and their controls 
• This approach can be applied to similar large software -
intensive systems where loss of control can lead to a 
hazard 
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Backup 
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Generic Hazards (CxP 70038) 
-Collision 
-Loss of Control 
-Contamination 
-Corrosion 
-Electrical Discharge/Shock 
-EnvironmentallWeather 
-Temperature Extremes 
-Accelerations/Decelerations/ Gravitational 
Forces 
-Electromagnetic Interference 
-Radiation (Ionizing/Non-Ionizing) 
-Explosion 
-Fire/Overheat 
-Flight Termination Systems 
-Implosion/Loss of Pressure 
-Pneumatic/Hydraul ic Pressure Sources 
-Impact from Debris 
-Impact from Structural Failure 
-Loss of Structural Integrity 
-Mechanical 
-Loss of Critical Function 
-Loss of Safe Return Capability 
-Loss of Habitable Environment (PPE/PVS 
and Breathable Air) 
-Loss of Habitable Environment from 
Toxins/Contamination 
-Pathological/Physiological/ Psychological 
-Inadequate Human Factors 
-Lasers 
-Utility Outages 
-Common Cause Failures 
Operational Data Sources 
-CxP 72119, GS Ops-Con Document 
-CxP 72149, GO Planning Document 
-Processing Facility Breakdown 
-GSElFacility System List (By Facility) 
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GO Hazard Analysis Structure 
Loss of Life, 
Facility, 
Hardware 
~ 
I I I I 
Processing Processing Processing Processing Processing 
in Facility #1 in Facility #2 in Facility #3 in Facility #4 in Facility #N 
~ 
r I 
HR HR HR 
GO-FAC3- GO-FAC3- GO-FAC3-
001 002 003 
r I 
Hazard Hazard Hazard 
Cause #1 Cause #2 Cause #N 
Ground Operations Top-Level Fault Tree Analysis 
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Processing Facility Breakdown 
-RPSF (LAS - Pre-DD250) 
-ARF (Aft Skirt - Pre-DD250) 
-O&C (Orion - Pre-DD250) 
-MPPF (Orion) 
-RPSF (First Stage) 
-VAB (IntegrationlTesting of Elements) 
-Pad (Testing/Loading/Launch) 
-Recovery Ships/Hangar AF (FS, CM) 
SE&IIElement Hazard Analysis 
Data 
-Element Hazard Causes (requiring GO 
hazard controls/verifications) 
-Integrated Hazard Causes (requiring GO 
hazard controls/verifications) 
-SE&I Functional Hazard Analysis (GO 
portion) 
-Element Pre-DD250 Hazard Analyses 
(e.g., LAS [RPSF], Orion [O&C]) 
GO Hazard Analysis Data Sources 
-SSP Hazard Reports/Critical Items 
-SSP System Assurance Analyses 
-SSP Ground Operational Risk 
Assessments 
-Ares I-X Operating and Support 
Hazard Analyses 
-Ares Level V SAAs (New/Modified) 
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Hazard Report Matrix 
C3, C11 C6 C1,C6,C8 C1 
C3 (X3) C3, C11 C6 C3 C2 C5 C5 C1,C6,C8 C4 
C6 C3 (X3) C3, C11 C6 C3 C5 C5 C6 C1,C4,C6,C8 C7 C2,C4,C5 C3 
C6 C3 (X3) C3, C11 C6 
C4 C3 C5 C5 C1,C4,C6 C2 
C3 (X3) C3, C11 C6 C3 C5 C5 C5 C1,C6 C7 
C3 (X3) C3,C11 C6 C3 C5 C5 C1,C6,C8 C6 
C3 (X3) C3,C11 C6 C3 C5 C5 C1,C6,C8 C4,C5 C7 
C3,C11 C5 C8 C5 C1,C6,C8 C4 
C9 C6,C8 C4 
C10 
C6 C3 (X3) C3, C11 C6 C3 C11 C5 C5 C6 C1,C4,C6,C8 C7 C2,C4,C5 
C6 C3 (X3) C3, C11 C6 C3 C12 C5 C5 C6 C1,C4,C6,C8 C7 C2,C4,C5 
C6 C3 (X3) C3, C11 C6 C3 C13 C5 C5 C6 C1,C4,C6,C8 C7 C2,C4,C5 
C6 C3 (X3) C3, C11 C6 C3 C14 C5 C5 C6 C1,C4,C6,C8 C7 C2,C4,C5 
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